2 edition of Contribution and claim reduction among antitrust defendants found in the catalog.
Contribution and claim reduction among antitrust defendants
A. Mitchell Polinsky
by Law and Economics Programme, Faculty of Law, University of Toronto in [Toronto]
Written in English
Includes bibliographical references.
|Statement||by A. Mitchell Polinsky and Steven Shavell.|
|Series||Law and economics workshop series -- no. WSIII-10|
|Contributions||Shavell, Steven, 1946-, University of Toronto. Faculty of Law. Law and Economics Programme.|
|LC Classifications||KF 1652 P76 1981|
|The Physical Object|
|Pagination||51 p. ;|
|Number of Pages||51|
lowed, plaintiffs will not have to indemnify settling defendants. If contribution is adopted, an indemnity provision in a settlement agreement would be equivalent to a claim reduction provision. For example, assume that there are two equally liable defendants, and one defen-dant settles before trial for Author: John Cirace. Multidefendant Settlements: The Impact Of Joint And Several LiabilityContribution and Claim Reduction among Antitrust Defendants: An Economic Analysis Jan
Loyola University Law Journal [Vol. 14 the parties.3 The question of whether contribution 4 should be available to antitrust defendants evidences this tension. 5 Antitrust violators are jointly and severally liable6 for the bus- iness injuries suffered by the plaintiff because of their illegal. The moving defendants answer that federal common law, which must be applied since the complaint and third party complaint rest on the antitrust laws, makes no provision for contribution among joint tort feasors second, that there can be no right of indemnity by operation of law in that such a right rests on the theory of passive and active tort which will not lie under allegations of joint wrongdoing; and, finally, .
Incentives to Settle Under Joint and Several Liability: An Empirical Analysis of Superfund Litigation Contribution among Antitrust Defendants: A Legal and Economic Analysis. 23 J. Law & Econ. (); A. Mitchell Polinsky & Steven Shavell. Contribution and Claim Reduction among Antitrust Defendants: An Economic Analysis. 33 Stan. L. Rev. ] CONTRIBUTION IN ANTITRUST ACTIONS 69 II. THE SARE SHIPING DECISION The article posed two fundamental questions which bad not then been resolved by the courts in a claim for contribution between antitrust treble damage defendants: 1. Is state law or federal law to apply in determining whether or not.
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The right to contribution among antitrust defendants is a con-troversial issue in antitrust litigation. Because a plaintiff can choose to recover all his damages from a single defendant,' notwithstanding the possible existence of other, perhaps more culpable defendants, the absence of a contribution rule Author: Donald J.
Polden, E. Thomas Sullivan. The University of Chicago Press. Books Division. Chicago Distribution CenterCited by: ISBN: X OCLC Number: Description: vii, 85 pages ; 23 cm. Series Title: Monograph (American Bar Association. Section of Antitrust Law.
With a no-contribution rule, a defendant who hands over information to a plaintiff knows that this cannot give rise to any future claims against it. In contrast, with a contribution rule, any increase in liability is eventually shared among all by: 3.
Three elements of the antitrust remedial scheme - joint and several liability, the absence of a right to contribution, and the offsetting of settlements against pre-trebled damages - combine to create several unfair results.
Similarly situated defendants can be forced to bear very different shares of a damage award at a plaintiff’s whim, and defendants collectively face incentives to settle for more than the sum Author: Joseph Angland.
"The Role of Contribution among Defendants in Private Antitrust Litigation," Working PapersCentre for Competition Policy, University of East Anglia. Jeong-Yoo Kim, " Secrecy and fairness in plea bargaining with multiple defendants," Journal of Economics.
Downloadable. To date the experience of the incidence of private actions for damages in antitrust cases has differed markedly across jurisdictions. The procedural rules surrounding private litigation may account for some of these differences.
This paper explores the effect of rules concerning contribution among multiple defendants who are joint and severally liable for a cartel infringement. Re-Designing the American Antitrust Machine Part I: Treble Damages, Contribution and Claim Reduction J OHN D EQ.
B RIGGS Axinn Abstract This is the first in a contemplated series of articles, and eventually a book, about “the American Antitrust Machine” and how it might or should be reconsidered if it were built from the groundFile Size: KB. Posner, Contribution Among Antitrust Defendants: A Legal and Economic Analysis, 23 J.L.
& ECON. (); Polinsky & Shavell, Contribution and Claim Reduction Among Antitrust Defend. In addition, the ''claim reduction'' feature of the bill would eliminate from the case any claim for damages caused by defendants with whom a plaintiff chooses to settle. Contribution Among Antitrust Violators: A Question of Legal Process C.
Douglas Floyd* The statutory scheme of the federal antitrust laws expressly provides for a variety of remedies in both government and pri- vate actions, including criminal penalties,' civil actions by the United States for injunction and damages,' private actions for.
Contribution among Antitrust Defendants: A Legal and Economic Analysis. Contribution and Claim Reduction Among Antitrust Defendants: An Economic Analysis. Environmental Liability and Redevelopment of Old Industrial Land. ().Author: Howard F. Chang and Hilary Sigman.
The District Court dismissed the third-party complaint for failure to state a claim upon which relief could be granted, holding that federal law does not allow an antitrust defendant to recover any contribution from alleged co-conspirators. The Court of Appeals affirmed. The Role of Contribution among Defendants in Private Antitrust Litigation by Morten Hviid ESRC Centre for Competition Policy and Norwich Law School, University of East Anglia & Andrei Medvedev ESRC Centre for Competition Policy, University of East Anglia CCP Working Paper Proposition 1 shows that joint and several liability generally increases (and never decreases) the expected liability by defendants relative to the base case.9 Nevertheless, 6For a justification of this assumption, see Easterbrook et al.
(), Contribution Among Antitrust Defendants, ~upra note 1, p. (agreements to cooperate are not Cited by: 8. about how that credit should be determined. The American Law Institute (ALl) has identified three principal alternatives for doing so: (1) pro tanto setoff with a right of contribution against the settling defendant; (2) pro tanto setoff without contribution; and (3) the "proportionate share approach," whereby the settlement diminishes the injured party's claim against nonsettling.
The District Court dismissed the third-party complaint for failure to state a claim upon which relief could be granted, holding that federal law does not allow an antitrust defendant to recover in contribution from alleged coconspirators.
The Court of Appeals affirmed. with no contribution can obviously facilitate settlement between plaintiﬀ and de-fendants in antitrust cases. Furthermore, victim can be overcompensated under JSL with no contribution if liability rule is optimal created. Polinsky and Shavell () also study the eﬀects of contribution, no contribution and claim reduction on settlement.
Antitrust contribution and claim reduction. Washington, DC (th St. NW, Washington ): National Legal Center for the Public Interest, © (OCoLC) of liability among antitrust coconspirators, but subsequent litigation has established that like joint tortfeasors, those acting in concert to violate the antitrust laws are jointly and severally liable.
6 Consistent with tort. Polinsky & Shavell, Contribution and Claim Reduction Among Antitrust Defendants: An Economic Analysis, 33 STAN. L. Rav. (). 5 The question of how these savings could arise is discussed infra at notes and accompanying text.
]Cited by: Antitrust and the New York Stock Exchange: a challenge for self- regulation/ Philip Anisman. KF A54 National security and foreign policy in the application of American antitrust laws to commerce with foreign nations: a preliminary report / by the Special Committee on Antitrust Laws and Foreign Trade of the Association of the Bar of.CONTRIBUTION IN ANTITRUST DAMAGE ACTIONS.
ROBIN STONE SELLERSf I. INTRODUCTION. THE. INCREASING AMOUNT OF PRIVATE ANTITRUST LITIGATION' in federal. courts2. has drawn public attention to the antitrust implications of daily business transactions. 3. Of special concern to potential defendants in private antitrust suits is the.